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545 
ARE THERE STILL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES  
IN NEW YORK AFTER PADILLA? 





In Padilla v. Kentucky,1 the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the failure of a criminal defense attorney to properly advise 
a defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea was a 
violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.2  Sig-
nificantly, the Supreme Court stated: “We . . . have never applied a 
distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the 
scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ”3 
In New York, the majority of cases to address Padilla have 
focused on whether a defendant’s guilty plea has unforeseen and un-
anticipated immigration consequences.4  This article will discuss the-
se consequences, as well as the enhanced obligation imposed on de-
fense counsel by Padilla to ensure that the client is fully informed of 
all the consequences of a guilty plea, whether they are direct or col-
lateral.  It will also discuss whether a defendant may seek to with-
 
* Hon. John H. Wilson serves in Bronx Criminal Court.  He is a graduate of Pace University 
School of Law, and has served as both a prosecutor and criminal defense attorney. 
1 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
2 Id. at 1478. 
3 Id. at 1481. 
4 See, e.g., People v. McDonald, 802 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 2003) (“This appeal raises the 
question whether, under certain circumstances, a defense counsel’s incorrect advice as to 
deportation consequences of a plea may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  We an-
swer in the affirmative but conclude that in the instant case—where defendant has failed to 
make the requisite showing of prejudice due to counsel’s incorrect advice—defendant was 
not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel under the Federal Constitution.”); People 
v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 266-67 (N.Y. 1995) (analyzing whether or not “Trial Judges or de-
fense counsel are under a duty to warn defendants of the possible deportation consequences 
before entering a guilty plea[,]” and “conclud[ing] that there is no such duty”). 
1
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draw a guilty plea for other collateral consequences. 
The article will then go beyond a discussion of the effect of 
Padilla on defense counsel’s obligations to investigate whether the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla affects one of the basic precepts of 
New York’s jurisprudence—that some consequences of a guilty plea 
are collateral results that are not within the control of a court.  In par-
ticular, it shall discuss whether post-Padilla, the Court has any en-
hanced obligation to warn a defendant of the collateral consequences 
of a guilty plea. 
At the conclusion of this article, it is this author’s hope that 
the reader will have an enhanced understanding of the far-reaching 
impact of Padilla and the effect this decision will exert in the future. 
II. OBLIGATION OF COUNSEL UNDER PADILLA 
A. The Strickland Standard in New York 
In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court based its ruling 
on the first prong of the two-prong test for effective assistance of 
counsel enunciated in Strickland v. Washington.5  The first prong is 
an analysis of whether or not “counsel’s representation ‘fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.’ ”6  In Padilla, the Supreme 
Court made very clear that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional 
norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding 
the risk of deportation” before a guilty plea will be accepted as know-
ing and voluntary.7 
The New York Court of Appeals has not directly adopted Pa-
dilla, and in fact, in the case of People v. McDonald,8 the Strickland 
test was only adopted where the defendant relied “solely on federal 
constitutional law.”9  For claims of ineffective assistance under the 
New York State Constitution, the Court of Appeals has held to the 
standard announced in People v. Baldi:10  “So long as the evidence, 
the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality 
 
5 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
6 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
7 Id. 
8 802 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 2003).  
9 Id. at 134. 
10 429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1981). 
2
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and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney pro-
vided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will 
have been met.”11  This standard of review under the New York State 
Constitution has been upheld repeatedly by the Court of Appeals.12  
However, “[t]he Second Circuit, in dicta, has questioned whether the 
New York ineffective assistance of counsel standard is ‘contrary to’ 
federal law as set forth in Strickland.”13 
In McDonald, the court ruled that an attorney’s failure to 
properly advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of his 
guilty plea “falls below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and 
could be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.14  
The court based its ruling on the affirmative nature of the attorney’s 
statement regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.15 
Following its earlier ruling in People v. Ford,16 the McDonald 
court stated that the mere “failure to advise a defendant of the possi-
bility of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”17  However, one of the effects of the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in Padilla is to abrogate this aspect of the Ford ruling.18  As stat-
ed in Padilla: “[T]here is no relevant difference ‘between an act of 
commission and an act of omission’ in this context.”19 
So far, many of the decisions in New York have centered on 
whether or not Padilla should be applied retroactively.  In People v. 
Kabre,20 for instance, the court held that “Padilla . . . announced a 
new rule of criminal procedure rather than applied settled law to a 
new set of facts and that the Padilla rule is not a ‘watershed’ change 
 
11 Id. at 405. 
12 See People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213 (N.Y. 2005); People v. Stultz, 810 N.E.2d 883 
(N.Y. 2004); People v. Berroa, 782 N.E.2d 1148 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Henry, 744 N.E.2d 
112 (N.Y. 2000); People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1998). 
13 See Scott v. Phillips, No. 05-CV-0142 (CBA), 2007 WL 2746905, at *8 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 54-55, 70 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
14 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 135. 
15 Id. 
16 657 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1995). 
17 Id. at 268. 
18 See People v. Garcia, No. 4902/02, 2011 WL 3569329, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 26, 
2011) (“The law in New York State at the time of the defendant’s guilty plea was governed 
by People v. Ford.  However, Padilla v. Kentucky, while not retroactive in the classical 
sense, does govern guilty pleas entered into at the time of the defendant’s plea of guilty.”) 
(citations omitted). 
19 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 30, Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)). 
20 905 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Crim. Ct. 2010). 
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that must be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.”21  
The majority of New York courts, however, have ruled that “Padilla 
did not announce a new constitutional rule, but merely applied the 
well-settled rule in Strickland to a particular set of facts.”22 
So far, the highest court to directly rule on this issue is the 
Appellate Term of the 9th and 10th Judicial Districts, in People v. 
Nunez.23  There, the court ruled that “[i]n Padilla, the Supreme Court 
merely applied the well-established Strickland standard[,] . . . a well-
established old rule.”24  However, as recently as February of 2012, in 
Medina v. United States,25 the Southern District ruled that the retroac-
tive applicability of Padilla “is an open question in this Circuit.”26 
The question of whether or not Padilla has a retroactive ap-
plication has reached the United States Supreme Court’s October cal-
endar.27  In Chaidez v. United States,28 the Seventh Circuit found that 
“Padilla effectively changed the law in the nine circuit courts . . . that 
had previously addressed the issue.”29  As such, it is a new rule with-
out retroactive effect.30  The Seventh Circuit’s approach has been 
 
21 Id. at 311; see also People v. Ramirez, No. 4676/1996, 2012 WL 1193762, at *3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 2012) (“Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral re-
view.”); People v. Andrews, No. 1903-2008, 2011 WL 1827891 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 
2011) (“Like the Kabre court, this Court finds that the scope of Padilla does not extend to 
cases in which immigration consequences are not clear and succinct, and therefore should 
not be applied retroactively . . . .”). 
22 People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 (Crim. Ct. 2010); see also People v. Castillo, 
No. 1690-03, 2012 WL 1570975 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2012); People v. Coles, No. 
8532/1994, 2011 WL 1991980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2011); People v. Garcia-Hernandez, 
No. 02556/2008, 2011 WL 846231, at *4 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Feb. 24, 2011) (finding that Pa-
dilla did not set-forth a new rule). 
23 917 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (App. Term 2010); see generally People v. Oouch, 948 
N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 2012) (showing that recently the Third Department applied Padilla 
retroactively, but without any statement to that effect). 
24 Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d at 809. 
25 Nos. 12 Civ. 238(JPO), 86 Crim. 238(WK), 2012 WL 742076 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 
2012). 
26 Id. at *4. 
27 See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
2101 (2012). 
28 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). 
29 Id. at 690 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 898 (Mass. 2011), abro-
gated by Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
30 Id. at 688 (“Under Teague, a constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies to all cas-
es on direct and collateral review if it is not a new rule, but rather an old rule applied to new 
facts.  A new rule applies only to cases that still are on direct review, unless one of two ex-
ceptions applies.  In particular, a new rule applies retroactively on collateral review if (1) it is 
substantive or (2) it is a ‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental 
4
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adopted by the Tenth Circuit,31 but rejected by the Third Circuit.32  
Thus, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear Chaidez, pre-
sumably to put to rest whether or not Padilla has a retroactive ef-
fect.33 
Shortly before publication of this issue of the Touro Law Re-
view, the United States Supreme Court handed down their ruling in 
Chaidez.34  There, in a majority opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court 
held that Padilla is not retroactive.35  In applying the standards for 
retroactivity announced in Teague v. Lane,36 the Court stated that to 
apply the Strickland standards to a historically collateral issue, it had 
to first ask “whether the Strickland test applied . . . the Court’s an-
swer (‘Yes, Strickland governs here’) required a new rule.”37  The 
high court cited the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning with approval; “Be-
fore Padilla . . . the [Supreme] Court had never held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to provide advice 
about matters not directly related to [a] client’s criminal prosecu-
tion.”38 
The dissent by Justice Sotomayor followed the reasoning ap-
plied by the majority of New York Courts when considering this is-
sue; “Padilla did nothing more than apply the existing rule of Strick-
land v. Washington.”39  In fact, the dissent criticized the majority’s 
claim that Padilla broke any new ground.  “Padilla declined to em-
brace the very distinction between collateral and direct consequences 
of a criminal conviction that the majority says it did.  In fact, the 
 
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”) (alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted).  A ruling is a watershed, if it is “ ‘necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an 
inaccurate conviction,’ and ‘must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements 
essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’ ”  Ramirez, 2012 WL 1193762, at *3 (quoting 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007)).  “[T]he Supreme Court has offered as an 
example its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright. . . .  ‘Padilla is not Gideon.’ ”  Id. (citations 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
31 United States v. Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1155 n.9 (10th Cir. 2011). 
32 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated by Chaidez v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (“Padilla followed directly from Strickland and long-
established professional norms, it is an ‘old rule’ for Teague purposes and is retroactively 
applicable on collateral review.” (footnote omitted)). 
33 Chaidez, 132 S. Ct. 2101.  
34 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103. 
35 Id. at 1107.  
36 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
37 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108. 
38 Id. at 1106 (alteration in original) (quoting Chaidez, 655 F.3d. at 693). 
39 Id. at 1114 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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Court stated very clearly that it found the distinction . . . .”40 
Thus, on the federal level, the issue of Padilla’s retroactivity 
has been decided.  However, because New York State can apply the 
standard for ineffective assistance claims announced by the Court of 
Appeals in Baldi to applications made under the State Constitution, it 
is unlikely that New York courts will see the limiting effect of 
Chaidez any time soon. 
It is important to emphasize that even when a defendant can 
establish that his counsel’s performance was insufficient, the defend-
ant must still satisfy the second prong of the Strickland standard—
that is, whether that defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of 
counsel’s deficiencies.41  In fact, Mr. Padilla himself did not satisfy 
this prong,42 and the Supreme Court remanded his case for a determi-
nation of whether or not that defendant had been prejudiced by the 
incorrect advice he received from his attorney.43 
Prejudice is a showing “that, but for counsel’s errors, [the de-
fendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial,”44 or, as the Court in Padilla put it, “a petitioner must 
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would 
have been rational under the circumstances.”45  In fact, even when the 
defendant has met the first prong of Strickland, withdrawal of a plea 
of guilty has been denied based upon the second prong of Strick-
land.46  The federal standards of review under Strickland, and New 
York’s application of the Baldi standard to the issue of prejudice are 
different.  Under Strickland, there is a two stage review of claims of 
ineffective counsel, with a showing of prejudice being a separate 
analysis, secondary to the initial finding regarding counsel’s effec-
tiveness.47 
Under the Baldi standard, “a court must examine whether 
counsel’s acts or omissions ‘prejudice[d] the defense or defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.’ ”48  Eschewing Strickland’s two stage analysis, 
 
40 Id. at 1117. 
41 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
42 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.12. 
43 Id. at 1487. 
44 See McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 134 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
45 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 486 (2000)). 
46 See People v. Valestil, 911 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Crim. Ct. 2010). 
47 Henry, 744 N.E.2d at 113. 
48 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Hobot, 646 
6
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the Court of Appeals has called its approach “flexible,” and “ulti-
mately concerned with the fairness of the process as a whole rather 
than its particular impact on the outcome of the case.  In that regard, 
we have refused to apply the harmless error doctrine in cases involv-
ing substantiated claims of ineffective assistance.”49 
The difference between the Strickland and Baldi standards has 
led to some confusion.  In People v. Bautista,50 the Court held that a 
“defendant is not required to ‘fully satisfy the prejudice test of Strick-
land’ ” since “the ‘prejudice’ prong of Strickland is effectively re-
dundant.”51  However, the Court of Appeals has stated: “We continue 
to regard a defendant’s showing of prejudice as a significant but not 
indispensable element in assessing meaningful representation.  Our 
focus is on the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.”52 
Under either standard, establishing prejudice is a heavy bur-
den.  Even where the court has held a hearing to investigate a defend-
ant’s allegations of prejudice, a review of the defendant’s motives for 
accepting a plea bargain, including the desire to avoid a jail sentence, 
have resulted in a finding of no prejudice.53  In Bautista, the Court 
still found that “there can be no prejudice as a result of counsel’s al-
leged misadvice since [defendant] would nevertheless be facing de-
portation” whether he plead guilty, or was convicted after trial.54  Re-
cently, in People v. Hernandez,55 while applying the Strickland 
standard, the First Department held that the “defendant did not estab-
lish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s inadequate advice on the 
deportation consequences of his guilty plea,”56 because the “defend-
ant decided to accept the plea . . . because pleading guilty was the 
course most advantageous to him.”57 
 
N.E.2d 1102, 1004 (N.Y. 1995)). 
49 Id. 
50 No. 2450-2002, 2011 WL 4907774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.  Oct. 12, 2011). 
51 Id. at *4. 
52 Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 887. 
53 See People v. Robles-Mejia, No. 2430/01, 2010 WL 1855762, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 
16, 2010) (“[D]efendant was not ‘prejudiced’ by his attorney’s alleged shortcomings.  Ra-
ther, defendant was solely motivated to plead guilty in order to avoid—at all cost—a . . . 
prison term.”). 
54 Bautista, 2011 WL 4907774, at *5; see also People v. Alonso, No. 7280-88, 2012 WL 
5456386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012) (applying the New York standard and finding defend-
ant received effective assistance of counsel). 
55 950 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App. Div. 2012). 
56 Id. (Sweeny, J., concurring). 
57 Id. at 269. 
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B. Defense Counsel’s Obligation to Warn of 
Immigration Consequences After Padilla 
The additional duties for defense counsel under Padilla are 
obvious.  In Padilla, defense counsel “not only failed to advise him 
of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him 
that he ‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had 
been in the country so long.’ ”58  Since defense counsel had clearly 
misadvised the defendant, “[t]he Solicitor General ha[d] urged [the 
court] to conclude that Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim only to 
the extent that he ha[d] alleged affirmative misadvice.”59 
The Supreme Court saved its strongest language in Padilla to 
address this contention, stating that “[p]reserving the client’s right to 
remain in the United States may be more important to the client than 
any potential jail sentence.”60  Thus, defense counsel is not only obli-
gated to give “correct advice,” counsel must speak up and warn de-
fendant of the immigration consequences of the plea, even if counsel 
has not been asked for advice in this regard.61 
Stating that “there is no relevant difference ‘between an act of 
commission and an act of omission’ in this context,” the Supreme 
Court held, in no uncertain terms, that “[w]hen attorneys know that 
their clients face possible exile from this country and separation from 
their families, [counsel] should not be encouraged to say nothing at 
all.”62  “It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client 
with available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure 
to do so ‘clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analy-
sis.’ ”63 
The Supreme Court’s concern that the defendant be properly 
advised on such a drastic consequence explains the Court’s “blurring 
of the line” between direct and collateral consequences in this con-
text.  This is made clear in the high court’s assertion that “[t]he di-
rect/collateral distinction has no bearing on the disposition of this 
case because . . . counsel must, at the very least, advise a noncitizen 
 
58 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 
(Ky. 2008), rev’d, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59 Id. at 1484. 
60 Id. at 1483 (alteration in original) (quoting INS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)). 
61 Id. 
62 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 30, Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)). 
63 Id. (quoting Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring)). 
8
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‘defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration 
consequences.’ ”64 
The Supreme Court did acknowledge that “[i]mmigration law 
can be complex, and . . . [t]here will, therefore, undoubtedly be nu-
merous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particu-
lar plea are unclear or uncertain.  The duty of [counsel] in such cases 
is more limited.”65  In such instances “a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”66  
Nevertheless, “when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it 
was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”67 
Thus, before Padilla an attorney’s affirmative misstatements 
regarding the collateral consequences of a guilty plea would consti-
tute a violation of the first prong of Strickland.  Post-Padilla, the at-
torney’s mere failure to advise the defendant of the collateral conse-
quences of the plea will also constitute a violation of the first prong 
of the Strickland standard. 
C. Counsel’s Duty to Warn of Other Consequences 
To date, the decisions in New York that discuss this issue 
have been restricted to reviews of the immigration consequences of a 
guilty plea.68  However, what if the defendant is facing other collat-
eral consequences, such as the loss of a firearm permit, or a loss of 
housing?  To date, there is only one trial court decision, rendered five 
years before Padilla, which may be instructive in this context.69 
In People v. Becker,70 the defendant sought to withdraw his 
guilty plea to the violation of disorderly conduct,71 asserting that his 
“prior counsel provided incorrect advice . . . regarding the effect that 
his guilty plea may have on his then-pending Housing Court proceed-
 
64 Id. at 1481 n.8, 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).  
65 Id. at 1483. 
66 Id. 
67 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
68 See McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 132 (finding that in certain instances, incorrect advice 
given by counsel regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea “may constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel”); Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 265 (questioning whether counsel is 
under an obligation to warn defendants of the consequences of entering a guilty plea). 
69 See generally People v. Becker, 800 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Crim. Ct. 2005) (discussing the col-
lateral consequence of losing housing). 
70 800 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Crim. Ct. 2005). 
71 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2011). 
9
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ing.”72 
The cooperative housing corporation in which defendant 
owned “shares of stock in a cooperative apartment . . . was attempt-
ing to evict him based at least in part upon the allegations in the 
Criminal Court complaint.”73  These allegations included the Class A 
misdemeanor of Assault in the Third Degree.74  Five months after de-
fendant pled guilty to the lesser violation, and was sentenced to a 
Conditional Discharge (with a requirement that he perform five days 
of community service), defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea, 
alleging that when he asked his prior attorney “how such a plea 
would affect his . . . right to his apartment . . . [h]is prior attorney . . . 
advise[d] defendant ‘that the plea . . . could not be used against [him] 
in any way regarding his apartment.’ ”75  However, after his plea of 
guilty, “the co-op commenced an ejectment action in Supreme 
Court.”76  That action included, as a basis for ejectment, defendant’s 
guilty plea to disorderly conduct.77 
Relying upon Ford, the Becker court noted that “[t]he Court 
[of Appeals] left open the question . . . of whether an attorney’s af-
firmative misstatements . . . may constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”78  Citing McDonald, the Becker court stated that “erroneous 
advise [sic] . . . may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel 
where there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s mis-
take, the defendant would not have pled guilty.”79 
Though Ford and McDonald both applied these rules to the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea, the Becker court reasoned 
that “the holding and rationale of McDonald applies”80 to counsel’s 
incorrect advice “regarding other collateral consequences, such as 
loss of housing.”81  In language which was to be echoed in Padilla, 
the Becker court stated as follows: 
Although it may be objectively unreasonable to re-
quire an attorney to be familiar with all of the various 
 
72 Becker, 800 N.Y.S.2d at 500. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 2011). 
75 Becker, 800 N.Y.S.2d at 501. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 503 (citing Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 268). 
79 Id. (citing McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 135). 
80 Becker, 800 N.Y.S.2d at 503. 
81 Id. 
10
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possible collateral consequences which may emanate 
from a particular guilty plea, it is not objectively un-
reasonable to require an attorney to consult with an 
expert or complete relevant research to help the attor-
ney accurately and properly advise a defendant regard-
ing potential collateral consequences . . . .82 
Thus, the Becker court found that “under the first prong [deficient 
performance] of Strickland, an attorney’s incorrect advice regarding a 
housing collateral consequence is just as ‘deficient’ as an attorney’s 
incorrect advice regarding a deportation collateral consequence.”83 
The Becker court also found that the allegation made by de-
fendant, that “had counsel correctly advised him regarding the collat-
eral consequences of his plea, he would not have pled guilty and 
would have proceeded to trial” and that this “would [have] be[en] 
sufficient to satisfy . . . the prejudice prong of Strickland.”84  Howev-
er, the court did not grant the motion outright.85  Instead, the court 
ordered a hearing “[i]nasmuch as the defendant’s allegations are con-
troverted by the People.”86 
Since Becker was decided under New York law pre-Padilla, 
the case examines counsel’s obligation to avoid providing misinfor-
mation regarding the additional collateral consequences of a guilty 
plea.87  In this context, Becker is important since its holding is not re-
stricted to the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. 
What is actually more significant about the case is its post-
Padilla effect.  While Becker applied to a situation involving an at-
torney who provided misinformation to the client, post-Padilla, coun-
sel’s failure to warn a defendant of other collateral consequences may 
also result in a finding of deficient representation. 
To date, Becker is the only reported case in New York involv-
ing counsel’s failure to warn of collateral consequences other than 
immigration penalties.88  However, in other states, the analysis of 
counsel’s performance has moved to the post-Padilla phase of in-
 
82 Id. at 504. 
83 Id. at 505 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-
88). 
84 Id. at 502, 505.  
85 Becker, 800 N.Y.S.2d at 505. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 503. 
88 Id. at 501. 
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quiry.89 
In State v. Agathis,90 the New Jersey Supreme Court faced the 
situation where, “defendant argue[d] he received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel when his attorney incorrectly informed him that he 
could regain his firearms identification card after completing his term 
of probation.”91  This advice was incorrect—under New Jersey law, 
the defendant was permanently barred from ownership of firearms as 
a result of his conviction.92 
Holding that “counsel’s performance fell below the standard 
expected of an attorney licensed to practice law,”93 the court “adopted 
an approach that ensures that a defendant considering whether or not 
to plead guilty to an offense receives correct information concerning 
all of the relevant material consequences.”94 
In view of Becker, Padilla, and Agathis, it would not be sur-
prising if New York courts are soon called upon to address similar 
applications based upon the failure of counsel to advise a defendant 
of other and sundry collateral consequences. 
 
D. Conclusions Regarding Counsel’s Obligations 
After Padilla 
So far, this article has discussed consequences that traditional-
ly have been considered collateral in New York—that is, “a result pe-
culiar to the individual’s personal circumstances and one not within 
the control of the court system,”95 as opposed to “[a] direct conse-
quence . . . which has a definite, immediate and largely automatic ef-
fect on defendant’s punishment.”96 
It has long been the view of many criminal justice advocates 
that a defendant should be fully informed of every consequence, both 
direct as well as collateral, prior to any guilty plea being entered.97  
 
89 See State v. Agathis, 34 A.3d 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
90 34 A.3d 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
91 Id. at 1267. 
92 Id. at 1268. 
93 Id. at 1270. 
94 Id.  
95 Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 268. 
96 Id. at 267. 
97 See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, 
and Misinformation in the Guilty Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 (2009) (“The 
12
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The Padilla decision has validated the view of these advocates; the 
attorney must now advise the client of all consequences of any guilty 
plea, the direct as well as the collateral.98 
Further, while the cases in New York have centered on immi-
gration consequences, after Padilla, other collateral issues, such as 
the housing issue discussed in Becker, may be the subject of future 
litigation.99  The attorney’s failure to advise the client of other collat-
eral matters, such as the ability to apply for a firearms license, have 
already become the basis for the reversal of a conviction in New Jer-
sey, as in the Agathis case cited above.100 
As has also been discussed, the United States Supreme Court 
asserted that “the direct/collateral distinction has no bearing on the 
disposition of this case because . . . counsel must, at the very least, 
advise a noncitizen ‘defendant that a criminal conviction may have 
adverse immigration consequences.’ ”101  In so stating, the Court 
made clear that regardless of whether or not the consequences be di-
rect or collateral, counsel’s failure to properly advise the client will 
be a violation of the first prong of Strickland. 
It is now time to discuss whether, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to differentiate between direct and collateral conse-
 
Court should reject the artificial, ill-conceived divide between collateral and direct conse-
quences and find that only a rule of full information about any severe consequences of a 
criminal conviction can adequately protect the constitutional values surrounding guilty 
pleas . . . .”). 
98 For a full discussion of counsel’s “[d]uty to [i]nvestigate and [r]esearch,” and counsel’s 
“[d]uty to [a]dvise on [c]onsequences of [p]lea and to [s]eek [a]lternatives,” see McGregor 
Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and 
Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54. HOW. L.J. 795, 812 (2011).  It should be 
noted that citation to this article is not an endorsement of the views expressed by the author 
of said article, except in his advocacy of better preparation and investigation by counsel; see 
also Paul Bennett Marrow, Limitations on the Duty to Advise: Knowing When it’s Time to 
Say More, Not Less, 83 N.Y. ST. B.J. 33 (2011). 
99 For a discussion of the collateral effect of any conviction, even for a violation such as 
Disorderly Conduct (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20), see Michael S. Kelton, Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions of Physicians, 19 N.Y. ST. ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. 3 
(2006), available at http://www.keltonlawfirm.com/pdf/Kelton_Collateral_Consequences.pdf;  
see also Jeremy H. Temkin, Supreme Court Clarifies Collateral Consequences of Tax Con-
victions, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202544708089&Supreme_Court_Clarifies_Collateral_Consequences_of_Tax_Convictions
&slreturn=20130320173640 (discussing the impact of Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 
1166 (2012)). 
100 See Agathis, 34 A.3d at 1271 (reversing a case where “defendant’s conviction rendered 
him permanently ineligible to obtain a firearms identification card” and who was conse-
quently found to not have been properly served by counsel). 
101 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 n.8, 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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quences, the trial court has any duty to warn a defendant of the col-
lateral consequences of a guilty plea. 
III. THE COURT’S OBLIGATION AFTER PADILLA 
A. Direct and Collateral Consequences 
In Ford, the Court of Appeals considered the question of 
whether the trial court “or defense counsel are under a duty to warn 
defendants of the possible deportation consequences . . . [of] a guilty 
plea.”102  In discussing the court’s “constitutional duty to ensure that 
a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what 
the plea connotes and its consequences,”103 the court made a very im-
portant distinction between direct consequences—“consequences of 
which the defendant must be advised,” and collateral consequences—
“those of which the defendant need not be advised.”104 
“A direct consequence is one which has a definite, immediate 
and largely automatic effect on defendant’s punishment.”105  Howev-
er, a collateral consequence is “a result peculiar to the individual’s 
personal circumstances and one not within the control of the court 
system.”106  Based upon this distinction, the Ford court ruled that 
“[d]eportation is a collateral consequence of conviction . . . 
[t]herefore . . . the trial court need not, before accepting a plea of 
guilty, advise a defendant of the possibility of deportation.”107 
Since deportation was a collateral consequence, the court also 
ruled that under the Strickland standard, “the failure of counsel to 
warn defendant of the possibility of deportation [did not] constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”108  The court noted that “some fed-
eral courts have held that affirmative misstatements by defense coun-
sel, may, under certain circumstances,” constitute ineffective assis-
 
102 Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 266-67. 
103 Id. at 267. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 268.  The Ford opinion includes a series of examples of collateral consequences, 
such as the “loss of the right to vote or travel abroad,” “loss of civil service employment,” 
“loss of the right to possess firearms, or an undesirable discharge from the Armed Services.”  
Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 267-68 (citations omitted). 
107 Id. at 268. 
108 Id. 
14
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tance.109  However, in Ford, “[d]efendant ha[d] not alleged . . . that 
counsel incorrectly advised him about the risk of deportation or that 
counsel’s advice, if any, induced him to plead guilty.”110 
As previously discussed, Padilla has abrogated the distinction 
between an affirmative misstatement by counsel and the failure to 
warn.  However, the entire framework of collateral versus direct con-
sequences has been thrown into doubt by this language in Padilla: 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla’s in-
effectiveness claims on the ground that the advice he 
sought about the risk of deportation concerned only 
collateral matters, i.e., those matters not within the 
sentencing authority of the state trial court.  
. . . .  
 We, however, have never applied a distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences to define 
the scope of constitutionally “reasonable professional 
assistance” required under Strickland.111 
Suddenly, it seems that there is no difference between a direct and 
collateral consequence, and as discussed in Part I, this has affected 
defense counsel’s obligations to fully apprise the client of all effects a 
guilty plea may have, whether they be collateral or direct. 
But what effect does Padilla have on the Court’s obligations 
to the defendant? 
B. The Trial Court’s Obligation to Warn After Padilla 
In People v. Gravino,112 the New York Court of Appeals had 
occasion to take up the issue of the collateral and direct consequences 
for a guilty plea in a different context.  There, the question was 
whether or not registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act 
(“SORA”) was a collateral consequence of defendant’s guilty plea.113  
The court held that SORA registration and the “terms and conditions 
of probation” are “collateral rather than direct consequences of a 
guilty plea” since the “conditions of probation are not subjects that a 
 
109 Id. at 269. 
110 Id. 
111 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689). 
112 928 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 2010). 
113 Id. at 1054. 
15
Wilson: Collateral Consequences After Padilla
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
560 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
trial court must address at the plea hearing.”114 
Defendant Gravino had argued that SORA registration was 
similar to post-release supervision, and as such, was a direct conse-
quence of a guilty plea.115  In support of her position, defendant cited 
People v. Catu,116 where the same court had held that “the failure of a 
court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the 
conviction.”117 
Citing Ford’s definition of a direct consequence as “ ‘one 
which has a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on de-
fendant’s punishment,’ ”118 the court in Catu concluded that 
“[p]ostrelease supervision is a direct consequence of a criminal con-
viction.”119  This is due to the elimination of parole for all violent fel-
ony offenders, making “the imposition of supervision . . . mandato-
ry.”120  This was the case, even though “the term of supervision to be 
imposed may vary depending on the degree of the crime and the de-
fendant’s criminal record.”121 
In Gravino, the court distinguished its holding from that in 
Catu: “[Post release] supervision . . . is, by statute, a component ele-
ment of a sentence, which is why a judge must pronounce the period 
of postrelease supervision at sentencing; . . . it is thus an integral part 
of the punishment meted out upon a defendant’s conviction of a 
crime.”122  “[A] SORA risk-level determination is not part of a de-
fendant’s sentence[;] . . . it is a collateral consequence of a conviction 
for a sex offense designed not to punish, but rather to protect the pub-
lic.”123  As such, “[t]hese consequences are not known at the time a 
court accepts a guilty plea, and therefore cannot have a ‘definite, im-
mediate and largely automatic effect on [a] defendant’s punish-
ment.’ ”124 
In a footnote, the Court of Appeals made clear that in this re-
 
114 Id. at 1049. 
115 Id. at 1054. 
116 825 N.E.2d 1081 (N.Y. 2005). 
117 Id. at 1082. 
118 Id. (quoting Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 267). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Catu, 825 N.E.2d at 1082. 
122 Gravino, 928 N.E.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). 
123 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Windham, 886 N.E.2d 179 (2008)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
124 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Catu, 825 N.E.2d at 1082).  
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spect, the decision in Padilla did not abrogate Ford.125  In fact, the 
Court of Appeals noted: 
[I]n Ford . . . “[t]he failure to warn of . . . collateral 
consequences will not warrant vacating a plea because 
they are peculiar to the individual and generally result 
from the actions taken by agencies the court does not 
control. . . .”  Specifically, we concluded that the trial 
court was under no duty to warn the defendant of the 
possibility of deportation before accepting his guilty 
plea because “[d]eportation [was] a collateral conse-
quence of conviction . . . peculiar to the individual’s 
personal circumstances and one not within the control 
of the court system. . . .”  
. . . . 
[T]he failure of the defendant’s attorney to warn him 
of the possibility of deportation as a result of his guilty 
plea did not state grounds for the ineffective assistance 
of counsel under Strickland, . . . although we left open 
the possibility that affirmative misstatements by coun-
sel might have done so.126 
Citing Padilla, the Court of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court: 
[H]ad “never applied a distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences” . . . however, “[w]hether that 
distinction [was] appropriate [was] a question” that the 
Court decided that it “need not consider” in Padilla 
since deportation had been “long recognized . . . [as] a 
particularly severe “penalty,” . . . “uniquely difficult to 
classify as either a direct or a collateral conse-
quence.”127 
On this basis, the Court of Appeals distinguished Justice 
Ciparick’s dissent in Gravino for “treat[ing] all consequences of con-
viction as punishment . . . thus obliterating the distinction between di-
rect and collateral consequences.”128  Thus, the obligation of the trial 
court remains the same; the court must advise a defendant of the di-
 
125 Id. at 1052 n.4. 
126 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 268).  
127 Gravino, 928 N.E.2d at 1052 n.4 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481). 
128 Id. at 1054 n.5. 
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rect consequences of his or her plea, but has no obligation to advise a 
defendant of any of the collateral consequences of that plea.129  This 
would, at present, seem to include the immigration consequences of 
the plea. 
It should be noted that some lower courts in New York have 
begun to voluntarily assume the obligation to warn criminal defend-
ants of the immigration consequences of their pleas.  In People v. 
Latalski,130 the court denied the defendant’s application to withdraw 
his guilty plea based upon the court’s own warning to defendant at 
the time he entered his plea, “that if, ‘as a result of these convictions, 
should the Immigration Service decide to deport you,’ it would not be 
accepted later as a basis for plea withdrawal and the defendant 
acknowledged that he understood.”131 
The court emphasized that it “had no duty to give warnings 
for a misdemeanor [because] [t]he Court’s role clearly differ[ed] 
from that of defense counsel,”132 and, “[g]iven the court’s warning 
about deportation, the defendant is hard pressed to show that the si-
lence of counsel actually prejudiced his defense.”133 
No analysis of this point can be complete without reference to 
New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 220.50(7).134  That sec-
tion requires: 
Prior to accepting a defendant’s plea of guilty to a 
count or counts of an indictment or a superior court in-
formation charging a felony offense, the court must 
advise the defendant on the record, that if the defend-
ant is not a citizen of the United States, the defend-
ant’s plea of guilty and the court’s acceptance thereof 
may result in the defendant’s deportation, exclusion 
from admission to the United States or denial of natu-
ralization pursuant to the laws of the United States.135 
 
129 See People v. Pierre, 913 N.Y.S.2d 655, 655 (App. Div. 2011) (“In accepting a guilty 
plea, the court is only obligated to advise a defendant of direct rather than collateral conse-
quences. . . .  Here, an enhanced sentence was a collateral consequence, at most.”) (citation 
omitted). 
130 No. 2003RI005021, 2012 WL 1606310 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) 
131 Id. at *1. 
132 Id. at *3. 
133 Id. 
134 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.50(7) (McKinney 2004). 
135 Id. 
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There are other states that have similar specific statutes re-
quiring the court to inform the defendant of the immigration conse-
quences of their guilty plea.  For instance, Minnesota’s Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 15.02(1) states: 
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty to any mis-
demeanor offense . . . the plea agreement must be ex-
plained in open court. The defendant must then be 
questioned by the court or counsel as to whether the 
defendant: . . . (3) Understands that, if the defendant is 
not a citizen of the United States, a guilty plea may re-
sult in deportation . . . .136 
In New York, however, the statute is specifically limited by the fol-
lowing provision: “The failure to advise the defendant pursuant to 
this subdivision shall not be deemed to affect the voluntariness of a 
plea of guilty or the validity of a conviction . . . .”137   
  As is so often the case, in Gravino, the Court of Appeals left 
the door open to a further review of the trial court’s obligation to in-
quire as to collateral matters during the entry of a guilty plea. 
[I]t may occasionally happen that a defendant, moving 
to withdraw his plea . . . can convincingly show 
that . . . newly discovered information, if known at the 
time of the plea, would have caused a change of heart. 
Where this is true, the motion to withdraw the plea 
will not be defeated simply by labeling a consequence 
“collateral.”138 
The first test of this caveat came in People v. Harnett.139  
There, the Court of Appeals ruled that further confinement of the de-
fendant under the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act 
(“SOMTA”) was a collateral consequence of a defendant’s plea, and 
the failure to warn a defendant that “he may be subject to 
[“SOMTA”] does not automatically invalidate the guilty plea.”140  
 
136 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.02(1)(3) (West 2010); see also Minnesota v. Lopez, 794 
N.W.2d 379, 381 (Minn. 2011) (showing that the Minnesota Court of Appeals allowed a pro 
se defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty where the trial court failed to inform the defend-
ant of the immigration consequences of his plea). 
137 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.50(7) (McKinney 2004). 
138 Gravino, 928 N.E.2d at 1056. 
139 945 N.E.2d 439 (2011). 
140 Id. at 440. 
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The court in Harnett reaffirmed its commitment to the distinction be-
tween collateral and direct consequences;141 however, “[a]s we made 
clear in Gravino, where [the] collateral consequences of a plea [is] an 
issue, claims that a nondisclosure rendered the plea involuntary are 
best evaluated on a case by case basis.”142 
It is unclear from the dicta of the Gravino opinion, and from 
the language of the Harnett opinion, whether or not it is the trial 
court’s failure to warn a defendant of certain collateral consequences, 
which, “if known at the time of the plea, would have caused a change 
of heart,” that could lead to the invalidation of the plea.143  In Har-
nett, the court rejected the defendant’s appeal reasoning that “[o]n 
this record, we do not know [] whether his lawyer told him about 
SOMTA . . . defendant has not made the factual showing that would 
justify plea withdrawal.”144  Defendant’s failure to show what advice 
the attorney gave would appear to maintain the court’s obligation to 
only warn a defendant of the direct consequences of his plea, regard-
less of the collateral consequences.145 
As noted in Part I, there are criminal justice advocates who 
strongly believe that a defendant should be fully informed of every 
consequence, both direct as well as collateral, prior to any guilty plea 
being entered,146 and that this obligation should be assumed by both 
the trial court as well as defense counsel.  However, to date, no court 
in New York has held that the trial court has any obligation to warn a 
 
141 Id. at 441. 
142 Harnett, 945 N.E.2d at 442-43. 
143 Gravino, 928 N.E.2d at 1056. 
144 Harnett, 945 N.E.2d at 443. 
145 Justice Ciparick’s dissent in Gravino considered the SORA registration requirements 
as direct and not collateral consequences, and as such, would have held that the trial court 
must warn a defendant of these requirements.  See Gravino, 928 N.E.2d at 1057-59 
(Ciparick, J., dissenting); Harnett, 945 N.E.2d at 443-44.  However, in Harnett, Justice 
Ciparick’s dissent stated a belief that subjecting a defendant to post-sentence confinement 
under SOMTA is “closer to a direct consequence than those traditionally considered collat-
eral.”  Id. at 444 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).  As such, “defendant should be given an oppor-
tunity to put before County Court . . . the specifics which are lacking in this record.  Id. at 
445.  Even this position does not dispute that “a court’s failure to warn a defendant of collat-
eral consequences does not merit withdrawal of a plea.”  Id. at 444.  Yet, Justice Ciparick’s 
dissent does show a willingness to weaken this barrier.  “I believe a defendant cannot be said 
to knowingly and voluntarily forgo his right to trial if he does not know the full extent of [the 
consequences] that might result from his conviction . . . fundamental fairness requires the 
defendant’s knowledge of that consequence.”  Id.  
146 See Roberts, supra note 97; Smyth, supra note 98.  As noted in Part I, citation to the 
latter article is not an endorsement of the views expressed by the author of said article, ex-
cept in his advocacy of better preparation and investigation by counsel. 
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defendant of the collateral consequences of their guilty plea, includ-
ing the immigration consequences of the plea.147 
Though not stated clearly in the cases, the reason for this posi-
tion is obvious: it is defense counsel, and not the court, who is re-
quired to discuss all options with a defendant, and provide that de-
fendant with advice based upon the attorney’s training and 
experience.148  Were the court to undertake this obligation, the court 
would be substituting its expertise for that of defense counsel, there-
by usurping the function of defense counsel.149 
In his dissent to the majority decision in Padilla, Justice Scal-
ia stated that “[t]here is no basis in text or in principle to extend the 
constitutionally required advice regarding guilty pleas beyond those 
matters germane to the criminal prosecution at hand—to  wit, the sen-
tence that the plea will produce.”150  To date, this is the same position 
maintained by the Courts of New York State.151 
Other states have not maintained the same distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences.152  Even before Padilla was de-
cided, in State v. Nunez-Valdez,153 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
noted that “it is preferable that the trial court inquire directly of de-
fendant regarding his knowledge of the deportation consequences of 
his plea.”154 
 
147 See Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 269 (stating that the court does not have an obligation to in-
form a defendant of collateral consequences). 
148 Smyth, supra note 98, at 812-13. 
149 Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Crimi-
nal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 623, 678-79 (2006). 
150 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1495-96 (“Adding to counsel’s duties an obligation to advise 
about a conviction’s collateral consequences has no logical stopping-point.”) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
151 See People v. De Jesus, 935 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (“[A] trial court has the 
constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understand-
ing of what the plea connotes and its consequences. . . .  This does not require ‘any particular 
litany when allocuting the defendant, but due process requires that the record must be clear 
that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative[s] . . . .”) 
(quoting Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 267) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
152 People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 893-94 (Mich. 2011) (“[D]eportation as a conse-
quence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, 
uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence . . . [t]he collateral 
versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a . . . claim concerning the specific 
risk of deportation.”  (third alteration in original) (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
153 975 A.2d 418 (N.J. 2009). 
154 Id. at 427. 
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In New Jersey, unlike New York, the trial court uses a written 
plea agreement form.155  The Nunez-Valdez court was concerned that 
“question seventeen on the plea form may be misleading in its use of 
the phrase ‘may be deported,’ ”156 and as a result, the court suggested 
that the form be amended to include stronger language, including ad-
vising defendants “of their right to seek legal advice regarding their 
immigration status.”157 
Thus, in New Jersey, the court had already undertaken some 
obligation to inquire as to the defendant’s knowledge of the effect a 
plea of guilty may have upon that defendant’s immigration status.  
Recently, this obligation has been expanded by Directive number 09-
11 from the Administrative Office of the Courts of New Jersey.158  
Dated December 28, 2011, the Directive requires municipal court 
judges to address the concern expressed in Nunez-Valdez at three 
points: “(A) as part of the court’s opening statement for each court 
session; (B) at defendant’s first appearance; and (C) as part of the 
guilty plea colloquy.”159 
The New York Court of Appeals has not read Padilla to re-
quire the trial court to make any inquiry of the defendant regarding 
their awareness of any but the direct consequences of their plea.  To 
date, in New York, the proper vehicle for addressing this issue is by a 
post conviction motion to vacate the plea, as having been made “in 
violation of a right of the defendant under the constitution of this 
state or of the United States.”160 
C. Conclusions Regarding the Court’s Obligations 
After Padilla 
Though the courts of New York have drawn a line, and will 
 
155 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:9-1 (West 2012) (“Any plea offer to be made by the 
prosecutor shall be in writing and forwarded to the defendant’s attorney.”), with N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW §220.50 (McKinney 2004) (“A plea to an indictment, other than one against a 
corporation, must be entered orally by the defendant in the person; except that a plea to an 
indictment which does not charge a felony may, with the permission of the court, be entered 
by counsel upon submission by him of written authorization of the defendant.”). 
156 Nunez-Valdez, 975 A.2d at 420. 
157 Id. 
158 For the test of NJ Court Directive 09-11, see GLENN A. GRANT, INFORMING MUNICIPAL 
COURT DEFENDANTS OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEAS, N.J. Directives, 
Dir. 09-11 (2001). 
159 Grant, supra note 158, at 1. 
160 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(h) (McKinney 2012). 
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not undertake any obligation to warn a defendant of the collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea, even before Padilla, the same courts 
had been willing to review whether a defendant received adequate 
advice from their attorney regarding these same collateral conse-
quences.  Though to date these reviews have been largely restricted to 
discussions of the immigration consequences of a plea, there is prec-
edent to review counsel’s advice (or misadvice or lack of advice) re-
garding other collateral consequences.  In every such analysis, even 
when the first prong of Strickland is met, and counsel is established 
to have provided deficient representation, the second prong, estab-
lishing prejudice, is much harder to attain. 
In either instance, in New York, it is the obligation of counsel, 
and not the court, to provide advice to the defendant regarding all the 
consequences of a guilty plea.  The court is only obliged to inform a 
defendant of the direct consequences of his or her plea.  The court 
will only examine the effect that collateral consequences have on a 
plea in the context of a motion to withdraw the plea.  To do otherwise 
would subvert the role of counsel for the defendant. 
However, before concluding, one further aspect of the Padilla 
decision should be discussed, which has been proven incorrect.  The 
United States Supreme Court denied that there would be a “flood” of 
requests for review of convictions as a result of the Court’s decision 
in Padilla.  In fact, the Court stated that “[i]t seems unlikely that our 
decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions al-
ready obtained as the result of plea bargains.”161  The Court stated 
that “pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than 
convictions,162 because “[t]hose who collaterally attack their guilty 
pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the 
plea.”163 
At last review, there are over one hundred citations to the Pa-
dilla decision reported on Westlaw.164  These decisions range from 
the various state and federal trial courts, to intermediate courts of ap-
peal, to the federal circuits.  There are decisions which decline to ex-
tend Padilla, to those which distinguish Padilla, to those, which fol-
 
161 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See Dan Kesselbrenner & Lory D. Rosenberg, Immigration Law & Crimes § 4:4 (2012) 
(showing a comprehensive state by state listing of post Padilla decisions). 
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low.165  This may not fit the Supreme Court’s definition of a flood-
gate, but the trial courts tasked with handling these post-conviction 
motions may disagree.  But, at the same time that the Supreme 
Court’s view of what constitutes a “floodgate” is disputed, the over-
worked lower courts may take pride in the high court’s assessment of 
our abilities: “There is no reason to doubt that lower courts—now 
quite experienced with applying Strickland—can effectively and effi-




165 See id. (“As courts have begun to interpret and apply Padilla v. Kentucky to motions to 
vacate guilty pleas and other forms of post-conviction relief, the courts have differed in their 
opinions.”); see also Maria Baldini-Potermin, Padilla v. Kentucky One Year Later: Courts 
Split Over Interpretation and Application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Constitutional Hold-
ings, 88 No. 23 Interpreter Releases 1449 (2011) (discussing the split in opinions among 
courts). 
166 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
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